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Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a
state from proving criminal charges with
evidence discovered during an inventory
search. In reaching its decision, the Court
found the facts of the case to be controlled
by principles governing inventory searches
of automobiles and of an arrestee's personal
effects as set forth in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)and 11/inoisv.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), rather than
searches of closed trunks and suitcases conducted solely for the purpose of investigating criminal conduct. Chadwick, Sanders.
Inventory searches are not subject to the
warrant requirement because they are conducted by the government as part of a community caretaking function, totally divorced
from the detection, investigation or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation
of a criminal statute. Cady v. Dombrowski~
413 U.S. 433 (1973). Moreover, neither
the policies behind the warrant requirement nor the concept of probable cause are
implicated in an inventory search because
they relate to the detection, investigation
and acquisition of evidence in a criminal
procedure. Since no claim was made in
Bertine that procedures instituted were a
subterfuge for a criminal investigation, the
Court's analysis centered upon the reasonableness of the routine caretaking functions.
In order to justify an intrusion on a constitutionally protected right, governmental
and societal interests must outweigh the
protected right. Automobile inventory
searches have been recognized as a means
of: ( 1) the protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody;
(2) the protection of the police against
claims or disputes over lost or stolen property and (3) the protection of police from
potential danger. 475 U.S. at __, 107
S.Ct. at 741.
In Bertine, Chief]ustice Rehnquist found
that strong governmental interests are
served by protecting an owner's property
while the property is in police custody and
insuring against lost or stolen property.
Further, the police who were acting in accordance with standard caretaking procedures did not act in bad faith. 475 U.S. at
__, 107 S.Ct. at 742. In his dissent,
Justice Marshall contended that the search
was unconstitutional because department
regulations gave police discretion to choose
between impounding the van or parking
and locking it in a public place. But according to the majority, the exercise of
discretion was exercised according to standardized criteria on the basis of something
other than suspicion of criminal conduct.
The dissent, as well as the Supreme Court
of Colorado, expressed the view that the
police, before investigating a container,
should weigh the strength of an individual's

privacy interest against the possibility that
the container might serve as a repository
for valuable items. In addition, the dissent
maintained that Bertine's expectation of
privacy in his backpack and its contents outweighed the governmental interests since
the intrusive search had gone into an intimate area of personal affairs. The Court
rejected these contentions, stating that a
single function standard is essential to
guide police officers who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and
balance the societal and individual interests evidenced in the specific circumstances
they confront. See New York v. Belton,
453 u.s. 454 (1981).
This case distinguishes constitutional
inventory searches from unconstitutional
ones. Bertine also indicates that inventory
searches will be valid so long as they are
conducted according to standardized procedures and on the basis of something other
than the suspicion of criminal activity.
Bertine follows a trend of other Supreme
Court decisions which hold that the legitimate governmental interests outweigh individual Fourth Amendment interests.
- William J. Morrison

California Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n. v. Guerra, Director,
Department of Fair Employment
and Housing: STATE MANDATED
BENEFITS FOR PREGNANT
EMPLOYEES HELD NOT
DISCRIMINATION UNDER
TITLE Vll
The United States Supreme Court has
upheld a California state statute which requires employers to provide female employees unpaid pregnancy leave of up to four
months. The employer's original action in
the United States District Court for the Central District of California challenged the
validity of the statute with respect to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. The court granted
the employer's motion for summary judgment, stating that the California statute was
pre-empted by Title VII and was therefore "inoperative under the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution."
33 EPD ,34,227, 34 FEP Cases 562 (1984).
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed, based on a finding
that the California statute was neither inconsistent with nor unlawful under Title
VII. Rather, the court found the statute
furthered the goal of equal employment
opportunity for women. California Federal
Savings & LoanAss'n. v. Guerra, 758 F.2d
390 (1985). The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, and in a 6-to-3 decision affirmed
the decision of the court of appeals.

Lillian Garland, a receptionist at a Los
Angeles based savings and loan, lost her
job after taking three months' pregnancy
leave. Garland filed a complaint with the
Department of Fair Employment and
Housing, which charged the bank with
violating § 12945(b)(2) of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV'T
CODE ANN.§ l2900et seq. Section 12945
(b)(2) requires an employer to grant an employee leave for a reasonable period oftime
on account of pregnancy. The Fair Employment and Housing Commission had
construed this section as providing pregnant workers a qualified right to be reinstated to the position they held prior to
their absence. Before the scheduled hearing took place, however, the bank, joined
by the California Chamber of Commerce
and a local trade union (both represented
numerous employers throughout the State
of California), filed this action in district
court seeking a declaration that§ 12945(b)
(2) is inconsistent with and preempted by
Title VII, and an injunction against its enforcement. Title VII prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of sex. The district court granted summary judgment for
petitioners, but the court of appeals reversed. Justice White delivered the opinion
of the Court.
In concurring with the decision on appeal, Justice Marshall first discussed
whether the California statute was preempted by Title VII. There are three ways
in which federal law may supersede state
law: in express terms; by inference where
there is no room for supplementary state
regulation; and when state law conflicts
with federal law. The Court dismissed the
first and second alternatives as inapplicable to the situation at hand, but concluded that the third basis for preemption
was at issue in the case herein. Sections
708 and 1104 are the two sections of the
1964 Civil Rights Act which the majority
analyzed with respect to preemption. Because both sections provide a liberal construction concerning state regulation of
employment discrimination, the Court
concluded that Congress recognized the
importance attached to state antidiscrimination laws and in no way intended to displace them. Therefore, it was held that §
12945(b)(2) is not pre-empted by Title VII.
The Court next discussed the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA"), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k), which amended Title
VII with respect to the definition of sex
discrimination. The Act specifies that sex
discrimination includes discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy. The petitioners
argued that the California statute provides
"special treatment" for pregnant employees,
and is therefore rejected by the language
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of the PDA. With support from business
groups and the Reagan administration,
petitioners claimed that the PDA requires
pregnant workers to be treated the same as,
but not better than, workers with other
disabilities. Based on the legislative history
behind the enactment of the PDA, the
Court agreed with the court of appeals'
conclusion that its purpose is to provide
"a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-not a ceiling
above which they may not rise." Guerra,
758 F.2d at 396. The 1978 amendment was
passed specifically to overturn a 1976 Supreme Court decision in General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 ( 1976) which
had held that discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy was not sex discrimination
under Title VII. The Court further explicated that Congress intended the Act "to
provide relief for working women and
to end discrimination against pregnant
workers," and that had Congress intended
to prohibit preferential treatment, it could
have expressly done so within the PDA
itself. In support of this latter conclusion,
the Court noted similar state statutes in
force at the time the PDA was enacted, and
the House and Senate reports which suggested that these laws would continue in
effect under the Act. Finally, the Court
found that§ 12945(b)(2) of the California
statute is not inconsistent with the PDA
because both "achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group ... of employees over
other employees." 474 U.S. __ (1986),
citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
u.s. 424, 429-430 (1971).
The last part of petitioners' claim stated
that § 12945(b)(2) requires employers to
violate Title VII because they cannot comply with both the federal and state law. The
Court was quick to invalidate this argument, stating that the California statute
merely establishes benefits that employers
must provide to pregnant workers, and
that it does not prevent employers from
giving comparable benefits to other disabled employees. In sum, the Court denied petitioners' facial challenge to§ 12945
(b)(2), ruling that the special benefits provided by the statute as construed by the
Fair Employment and Housing Commission do not violate federal civil rights laws.
"By taking pregnancy into account," Justice Marshall said, "California's pregnancy
disability leave statute allows women, as
well as men, to have families without losing their jobs." 474 U.S. __ (1986).
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White
felt that the California statute was "in
square conflict" with the federal law because it requires "every employer to have a
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disability leave policy for pregnancy even
if it has none for any other disability."
Therefore, the state statute is pre-empted
by the federal law. In pointing to the plain
language of the PDA, Justice White wrote
that it clearly mandates equal treatment
for employees, including pregnant workers,
and that it does not intend pregnancy to be
in a class by itself within Title VII. Further, the minority felt that the Court's interpretation of the PDA with respect to the
state statute places an unfair burden on California employers by requiring them to implement new minimum disability leave
programs to satisfy both the state and federal laws.
The effect of this decision on other state
statutes is clear. While not mandating the
type of preferential treatment afforded in
California, the holding in Guerra evidences
the Court's willingness to uphold similar
statutes in the future as non-violative of
discrimination laws. Those states which
decide to enact preferential treatment
statutes may find that they discourage employers from hiring women.
Maryland has included pregnancy in its
fair employment practices laws, but not to
the same extent as California. Article 49B,
§ 17 of the Annotated Code of Maryland
could not be construed as requiring the
"special treatment" involved in Guerra.
The statut~ merely calls for equal treatment with respect to pregnancy, stating
that any insurance or sick leave plan "shall
be applied to disability due to pregnancy
or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities subject to the provisions
of this section." (Emphasis added).

-Barbara E. Wixon
Chase v. State: LEON"GOOD
FAITH" EXCEPTION TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
EXTENDED TO PROBATION
REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS.

In a case of first impression, the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland in Chase v.
State, 68 Md. App. 413, 511 A.2d 1128
(1986) ruled that generally, the exclusionary
rule may not be applied to probation revocation proceedings. In so holding, the
court of special appeals has followed the
trend of a majority of other jurisdictions.
Appellant Jerome Edwin Chase was
convicted of robbery by the Circuit Court
for Prince George's County. His sentence
was suspended in favor of five years probation. Two years later, after he had already been cited and resentenced for probation violations, Chase was arrested and
charged with intent to distribute marijuana and simple possession. While the

criminal case was pending, the State filed a
petition to revoke Chase's probation; alleging a failure to "obey all laws." At the trial
for the criminal charges, the trial court
found the Appellant's arrest to be without
probable cause and suppressed the evidence
recovered from him at the arrest. Two
months later, the State dismissed the criminal charges. However, the petition to revoke Chase's probation was not dismissed.
At his probation revocation hearing, Appellant moved {based on the exclusionary
rule) to have the evidence seized at the
time of his arrest suppressed, or have the
proceeding dismissed. The court, in denying Chase's motion applied a balancing
test and determined that "the probation
process and community safety interests far
outweigh any deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule." In light of their finding, the
lower court therein ruled that the exclusionary rule did not apply to probation revocation proceedings.
In dealing with this case of first impression, the court of special appeals traced the
chronological history of the exclusionary
rule at the Supreme Court level from Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) to the
present. Judge Wilner, writing for the majority, noted that even before Mapp v.
Ohio, 364 U.S. 643 (1961), [which overturned Wolf v. Colorado, when it held that
"all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is,
by that same authority, inadmissible in a
state court;" Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643], "the
[Supreme] Court has viewed the exclusionary rule as a deterrent rather than a
redressive measure", Chase, 68 Md. App.
at 419, 511 A.2d 1128. Atthe end of their
historical analysis, the court herein recognized the fact that the balancing test [established in U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 894
( 1984)] "remains an integral part of the
decisional law in this area." Chase at 420,
511 A.2d 1128. In Leon, the Supreme Court
actually retracted the exclusionary rule by
withdrawing its application to evidence
obtained in reasonable reliance on a search
warrant issued by a neutral magistrate
which was later found to be unsupported
by probable cause. The deterrent effect of
the exclusionary rule on the police would
be insignificant and is greatly outweighed
by its detrimental effect on criminal prosecutions.
In their analysis of Maryland case law on
the application of the exclusionary rule,
the court of special appeals looked to
Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 425 A.2d
632 (1981), where the Court of Appeals of
Maryland adopted the ruling of U.S. v.
Lee, 540 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir.) cere. denied
429 U.S. 894 (1976) and declined to extend the exclusionary rule to sentencing

